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patriotism has always been high on Andrzej 
Wajda’s agenda. Already in the 1950s, in Kanał 
(1957) and Popiół i Diament [Ashes and Dia-
monds] (1958), he chronicled stories of heroism 
and national loyalty set against the war-scarred 
Polish landscape. Because of heavy govern-
ment censorship, back then Wajda’s criticism 
of the Soviet-instigated political system in 
Poland could only be symbolically inserted into 
his film plots. Later, with Człowiek z marmuru 
[Man of Marble] (1977) and Człowiek z z˙elaza 
[Man of Iron] (1981), the director was able to 
reveal his political opinions with much more 
confidence. For obvious reasons, even those 
films never contained any candid anticommu-
nist or anti-Soviet views. Only since the 1990s 
have Wajda’s political convictions become 
more conspicuous, as he looks at Polish his-
tory through the lens of his half-romanticizing, 
half-revisionist camera, most evidently in his 
two national epics, Pan Tadeusz [The Last Foray 
in Lithuania] (1999) and Katyn´ (2007). With no 
censors keeping him at bay, the director now 
freely expresses his nonconformist national 
sentiments, where resistance to political influ-
ence from Russia sits at the center of Polish 
national characteristics.
 On the ideological level, both of Wajda’s 
contemporary epics set out an imaginary merid-
ian borderline that helps define the identity of 
his nation. Whatever lies to the west is marked 
as positive, whereas the eastern side is cer-
tainly associated with negative Russian abuse. 
The line does not literally match geographical 
borders of the country; it is a symbolic division 
between the good us and the evil them. This 
imaginary boundary is in no way the director’s 
invention but rather is an integral part of Polish 
political and cultural discourse, deeply rooted 
in the national tradition. Wajda’s attachment to 
similar binary national divisions appears rather 
dated to Western cinema viewers in the global-
ized world. Likewise, younger Polish film critics 
tend to dismiss them as simple stereotypes. 
These critics also often negatively comment 
on the elevated tones of Wajda’s recent epics. 
However, such voices of disapproval, even if 
undoubtedly present in Poland, do not have 
the power to halt the production of film epics, 
which—usually made by older-generation direc-
tors, including Jerzy Hoffman, Jerzy Kawalero-
wicz, and Andrzej Wajda—have now promoted 
lofty national ideals for more than a decade.
 Since the 1989 systemic transformation 
from communism to capitalism, Polish view-
ers have witnessed a renaissance of historical 
and heritage epics. These monumental pro-
ductions saturate cinema screens with myths 
of national loyalty and frequently propagate 
Catholic values, which for many Poles are at the 
core of their new European identity. Starting 
the epic trend at the end of the 1990s, along 
with Jerzy Hoffman’s Ogniem i mieczem [With 
Fire and Sword] (1999), Andrzej Wajda’s Pan 
Tadeusz proved immensely popular among 
domestic audiences. This highly fictionalized 
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heritage film was adapted from an obligatory 
school reading under the same title. The origi-
nal, which had been written in verse back in 
the nineteenth century by Polish national bard 
and émigré poet Adam Mickiewicz, presented 
a nostalgic vision of an independent national 
gentry culture that at the time had already been 
disappearing.
 Wajda’s film adaptation closely replicates 
the idyllic world from Mickiewicz’s book. It of-
fers almost the same stylized look at the Polish-
Lithuanian gentry allying with Napoleon to fight 
their Russian oppressors. By adapting the text, 
with which almost every Pole is familiar, the 
director managed to draw a huge number of 
viewers. Pan Tadeusz, which opened in October 
1999, overall attracted more than six million 
domestic cinemagoers in the following year 
(“Przeboje kasowe 2000 w polskich kinach”). 
This immense popularity of Wajda’s first epic 
resulted from the fact that he translated the 
well-known but now slightly dated Pan Tadeusz 
for the needs of the more visually oriented turn-
of-the-century audience yet never really moved 
far from the original.
 Wajda’s script is developed around two sto-
rylines, the romantic and the patriotic. At first, 
the viewers follow the eponymous Tadeusz in 
his innocent and many times comically erratic 
search for a perfect spouse, accompanying his 
friends and family in their rows and petty local 
conflicts. These pursuits are swiftly abandoned, 
however, when a patriotic cause of defending 
Lithuania (in the nineteen century an integral 
part of Poland) calls them to stand up against 
the Russian czar’s soldiers.
 Returning to the times when Polish patrio-
tism developed as a moral stance of active 
opposition to the eastern enemy of the country, 
Wajda’s 1999 epic manifests nostalgia for the 
heroic national past, as its spectacular plot 
stems from a long-term Polish feud with the 
neighboring nation. Along with Hoffman’s epic, 
which in the same year recounted fictional tales 
of the eighteenth-century Polish-Ukrainian 
wars, Pan Tadeusz marks the beginning of a 
tendency present to this day in Polish film 
epics, whereby with only a few exceptions char-
acters representing the cultures east of Poland 
tend to be either ridiculed or vilified.
 Despite the voices of such critics as Mary P. 
Wood, who foresaw the end of popularity of 
film epics in Poland after 2001 due to “the 
difficulty of using the epic template in a politi-
cal situation of mass emigration in search of 
work and encouragement of a more European 
identity” (145), epics have not disappeared 
from Polish cinema venues. Katyn´—along with 
Bitwa Warszawska 1920 [Battle of Warsaw 
1920] (2011), the latest 3D picture directed by 
Jerzy Hoffman—emanates an air of melancholic 
longing for the morally superior Pole, whose 
presence on the screen helps revive the patri-
otic spirit of the nation, now a member of the 
united Europe.
 Katyn´, as its title indicates, is based on 
historical events from the twentieth century. 
The film follows characters whose families and 
friends were affected by the massacre of 22,000 
Polish officers and intellectuals committed by 
the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
(Narodny komissariat vnutrennikh del, or NKVD) 
in Katyn´ in April 1940. Its story parallels some of 
the events in the director’s family; Wajda appar-
ently lost his father Jakub in Katyn´. For Wajda, 
the film closes the now almost-lifelong chapter 
of his World War II output and serves as his final 
artistic expression of sorrow, intended to leave 
“the pain behind” (Sobolewski). It depicts the 
war and the postwar Soviet-instigated commu-
nist regime as victimizing vehicles that trapped 
Polish citizens and required unusual strength 
from those who survived. Notably, Wajda’s film 
forms the first-ever cinematic reference to the 
massacre, and it rightly ascribes the responsi-
bility for it to the Soviets.
 The plot follows three women, Anna, Róz˙a, 
and Agnieszka, whose male relatives were 
murdered by Soviets in the Katyn´ Forest Mas-
sacre. We are offered a highly episodic account 
of their lives in Cracow during World War II and 
shortly after. As a rule, the director reveals only 
the most dramatic moments, when the women 
either have to fight for survival or receive bad 
news about the fate of their spouses and 
siblings. Thus, it is fairly difficult to form an 
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emotional bond with the protagonists, espe-
cially given that their lines and acts may strike 
the viewer as rather theatrical. For most of the 
film, the Cracow stories are only punctuated by 
gloomy peeks at the officers in the POW camp, 
destined to be eventually killed in the final 
massacre sequence. Due to the brevity of such 
scenes, it is even harder for the audience to 
relate or identify with the fears and suffering of 
these prisoners.
 Katyn´’s episodic plot may prove unclear to 
some Western audiences because it highly re-
lies on the viewer’s familiarity with Polish-Rus-
sian history relating to World War II. Yet the now 
over seventy-year-old events and the national 
animosities that ensued from them are still very 
much alive in the contemporary political and 
cultural discourse in Poland, having returned 
to the public eye in the 1990s after fifty years 
of communist suppression. Their presence in 
national media and education persists to such 
a degree that any potential lack of such knowl-
edge among Western audiences never occurred 
to highly optimistic officials at the Polish Film 
Institute when they selected Katyn´ to be Po-
land’s Oscar candidate. Later, when Wajda’s 
much-celebrated 2008 Oscar nomination did 
not lead to the win for the Academy Award for 
Best Foreign Language Film, some critics in the 
country expressed their deep disappointment. 
To them, however based in the national history, 
the film appeared very much unique and rele-
vant to the present time. Not only did it portray 
a massacre that had never been examined in 
the cinema, but also its negative representa-
tion of Russian communists seemed to be uni-
versally appealing and almost contemporary, 
especially given the relatively recent fiasco of 
the Soviet regime.
 Katyn´’s political message is clear, if not lit-
eral. Even though, unlike Pan Tadeusz, Wajda’s 
World War II epic leaves the bygone idealized 
national heritage behind, the director still ad-
heres to the same national sentiments. Despite 
his otherwise revisionist historical intentions, 
just like in Pan Tadeusz, here Wajda again in-
directly promotes the new European identity 
of his nation, which is defined in opposition to 
the now-gone communists, represented as of-
fensive Soviets, to whom the noble Polish stand 
up. The most patriotic Poles on the screen are 
always the most resistant to the Soviet influ-
ence. In Katyn´ Wajda strips the national struggle 
of all the glory of Pan Tadeusz to convey a grim 
vision of indomitable Poles and their martyrdom 
under the Soviet rule, which in turn awards 
them a distinctive position in Europe.
 In her discussion of Eastern European heri-
tage films, Dina Iordanova notes, “[T]he people 
of Central Europe look at history from a specific 
angle: they come from small countries which 
are usually powerless to make developmental 
decisions, yet need to react to whatever politi-
cal shifts and advances occur (usually at the 
instigation of a neighboring great European 
power)” (43). Even though their political weak-
ness may appear to be a solid fact from an 
outside European perspective, Poles do not 
share similar views on their national identity 
and their position in the continent. In both 
Pan Tadeusz and Katyn´, Wajda clearly affirms 
that it is not political strength that, for many 
people in the country, makes Poles equal or 
even superior to their neighboring nations. 
It is the moral power, the heroism, and the 
 nonconformity—the fact that one cannot crash 
the spirit of a Pole—that form the basis of the 
identity of the nation. Wajda both subscribes 
and contributes to this collective pride. The 
director’s advocacy of such unsurpassed tradi-
tional national identity is certainly determined 
by his own position on the history.
 After political and cultural changes in the 
1990s, seeking a remedy for confusion of val-
ues and their doubts about the future, Poles 
often unwittingly looked to their past with nos-
talgic eyes (Sztompka 178–81). Many revisited 
their national history, hoping to find justifica-
tion for their contemporary preference for the 
new democratic system. In his films, Wajda im-
plies that Polish patriotism, as historical experi-
ence has dictated, should principally align with 
Western Europe and its democratic and capital-
istic ideals. His often disparaging representa-
tions of Russian nationals and their attempts to 
subjugate Poles—from the nineteenth-century 
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attacks by the czar’s troops to the twentieth-
century murderous deeds of the Soviets—help 
the director allusively expound his view on the 
new European identity of his country. Wajda’s 
portrayal of the Russian is a creative tactic that 
results from his attempts to boost the morale 
of the Polish. Conservative, straightforward 
anti-Russian readings of his epics, however, are 
quite frequent in the country, especially in light 
of recent political developments.
 Pan Tadeusz and Katyn´ gained new relevance 
after the 2010 plane crash in the Russian city of 
Smolen´sk that killed 96 people, including right-
wing Polish president Lech Kaczyn´ski, who was 
on his way to Katyn´ to commemorate the seven-
tieth anniversary of the same massacre that is 
central to Wajda’s World War II epic. Determina-
tion of the responsibility for the accident and 
for the death of the president provoked many 
political and diplomatic exchanges between 
the Polish and Russian governments, which 
were followed by a full-fledged onsite investiga-
tion. The endless press and political arguments 
surrounding the 2010 catastrophe have not 
concluded on either side. In the meantime, 
alleged Russian conspiracy theories started 
resonating in numerous political debates in 
Poland. As similar views sweep across the na-
tion, Wajda’s nostalgic gaze at the national 
history attracts new critical attention, whether 
he conveys his message through his unique 
screen reexamination of World War II history, 
which has recently returned to the political 
discourse because of to the crash of the presi-
dential plane, or through cinematic redrafting 
of the conventional literary masterpiece.
Pan Tadeusz: Sweet Polish Victory  
over a Weak Russian Enemy
Whereas Katyn´ is based on a fairly original 
screenplay loosely adapted from Andrzej Mu-
larczyk’s novel, Pan Tadeusz lingers over the 
traditional beauty of heroic Polish literature, 
which promotes hegemonic visions of Polish-
ness, typically taught at schools in the country. 
The fairly uniform teaching curriculum in Po-
land has always foremost emphasized the emi-
nence of patriotic works by Adam Mickiewicz, 
Henryk Sienkiewicz, and other national, if not 
nationalistic, writers. Patriotism, as advocated 
by these authors, tends to be synonymous 
with defending the Polish soil against attacks 
by either Germans or the eastern “other”—
namely, Russians or Ukrainians. In line with 
the expectations of devoted patriotic Polish 
readers, who mostly populate his audience, 
Wajda follows Mickiewicz’s perspective and 
never aspires to originality.
 Although the original Pan Tadeusz, the 
literary epic, primarily received critical ap-
preciation for its representation of the idyllic 
Polish-Lithuanian setting, author Mickiewicz—
who lived at the time when Poland was under 
the Russian rule—was also known as an avid 
promoter of collective political efforts to first 
regain and then defend sovereignty of his 
country. Focusing on national problems, not 
only does the nineteenth-century author pres-
ent his fellow countrymen as admirable in their 
traditional patriotism and Catholic faith, but 
he also intends to highlight national faults that 
need to be overcome before the Russian gar-
rison can be defeated. This particular aspect of 
Mickiewicz’s work captivated Wajda when he 
initially announced the plans for his first-ever 
heritage film. In the director’s own words, “[i]
t is certainly a great story . . . These Poles are 
foolish, just like us, in the country where you 
cannot form any stable political coalition. Tell-
ing this story again may result in an interest-
ing contemporary film!”1 (Wajda 10). Just like 
Mickiewicz, Wajda intended to appeal to the 
collective consciousness to revive some sense 
of national responsibility for the future of his 
country at the end of the 1990s, when Polish 
politics were polarized.
 However, the highly stylized film, whose 
characters speak in verse and use nineteenth-
century language, was critically acclaimed more 
for its spectacular depiction of the traditional 
patriotic culture and the director’s narrative 
strategy than for the director’s intended mes-
sage. Many commented on its potential as a 
strong domestic box office contender; others 
saw it as the first sign of a reemergence of high 
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production values in the national cinema. Upon 
its release, Polish film critic Andrzej Werner 
argued, “Wajda chooses universalism of his 
own culture against false universality of mass 
culture” (171).
 The all-embracing nature of Pan Tadeusz 
mainly results from its uplifting value. With its 
positive portrayal of the Pole, Pan Tadeusz devi-
ates from “tragic narratives” (Sztompka 77) that 
in the 1990s proliferated in popular Polish films 
(e.g., Dług [The Debt] (1998), which incidentally 
also dwells on Russian villains). These produc-
tions mostly chronicled the negative effects of 
the political and social transformation. When 
social problems dominated Polish screens, 
Wajda offered hope. Tradition was again alive, 
and his viewers could rest reassured in their 
national self-confidence, as they followed the 
love adventures of young Tadeusz set against 
a backdrop of national efforts to win indepen-
dence from the czar.
 In his own nostalgic manner, Wajda reaf-
firmed the traditional take on national friends 
and enemies that had already resurfaced in 
the political debates at the time. When in 1999 
Poland joined NATO, numerous skeptics openly 
voiced their concerns regarding anticipated 
threats to Polish national identity; these con-
cerns were reinforced by the country’s plans 
to join the European Union. The international 
situation of the country changed, and on 
the domestic scene the post-1989 systemic 
changes provoked collective symptoms of 
cultural trauma (Sztompka), which left many in 
doubt regarding the future of their country. With 
the national identity seeming unstable, Wajda’s 
glorious national characters inspired the Polish 
and motivated them in their political choices. 
Metaphorically, Pan Tadeusz served as a cin-
ematic approval of the then-approaching Polish 
alliance with Western Europe that was finally 
concluded in 2004, when the country indeed 
became a member of the European Union.
 The film’s highly romanticized outlook on 
the past potently displays the impotence of 
the nation’s eastern enemies, who are finally 
defeated by the united French and Polish. The 
dominance of the Polish over the Russians 
stands out in the film’s happy-ended narra-
tive, even if according to historical accounts 
Napoleon’s triumph over the czar’s army was 
unusually short-lived. The victory moves the 
narrative toward the climax in the concluding 
party. The scene of celebration that follows 
the return of Polish soldiers who fought under 
Napoleon is so visually elaborate that the brief 
final epilogue sequence from Paris, where we 
find some already much older characters in 
exile, can hardly reverse the inspirational effect 
of the heartwarming triumph over Russians.
 The battle with the Russians in Pan Tadeusz 
provides the main twist to the narrative, which 
features two conflicted Polish-Lithuanian 
families—the Horeszkos and Soplicas. As their 
argument over a local castle escalates, Count 
Horeszko makes a foray against Soplica’s 
house. His sudden invasion, however, proves 
unsuccessful and comes to an abrupt ending 
caused by an unexpected appearance of the 
czar’s troops. Without a second thought, the 
two Polish-Lithuanian families reconcile to 
fight against their common Russian enemy. 
The battle sequence offers the viewer many 
long and middle shots of the Russian soldiers 
displaying their incompetence and cowardice. 
Standing in rows against their more relaxed and 
dispersed enemies, they mechanically shoot 
only when loudly ordered by their drunk and 
quick-tempered major. This ineffective and truly 
comical fighting style eventually leads them to 
surrender. In contrast, the presentation of the 
Poles in the battle relies on well-timed, rapidly 
cut series of close-ups and middle shots, full 
of forceful energy. While cleverly directing 
their efforts to win against the more numerous 
regular Russian army, they surpass their enemy 
in skill and passion. The viewers are posi-
tioned to cheer the Polish-Lithuanian efforts, 
as Wajda’s camera allows them detailed and 
dynamic observations of that side’s actions. 
At the same time the Russians appear to be in 
the distance, visually achieved through distinct 
space between the camera lens and the actors. 
This separation further reinforces the feelings 
of Wajda’s audience and marks the partiality of 
his camera.
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 Not only do the Russian soldiers lack skill, 
courage, and wisdom, but they are also pre-
sented as a corrupted crowd. Their leader, 
Major Plut, turns out to be a sly national trai-
tor. To no viewer’s surprise, he ends up being 
killed by Warden, one of Horeszko’s servants, 
in an offscreen act of nationalistic revenge and 
punishment for his deceitful nature. Earlier in 
the story, the only positively portrayed Rus-
sian in the field, Rykow, promises his soldiers 
money to encourage—or rather bribe—them to 
fight. When the battle is finally over, the Rus-
sians break the agreed cease-fire to further 
highlight that they have no honor. Except for 
the two commanders of the regiment, the Rus-
sian troops stay anonymous to the audience, 
whereas by the time the battle starts, the spec-
tator knows most of its Polish participants. This 
simple familiarity-versus-anonymity scheme 
highlights the director’s national preferences. 
It also directs the viewer’s sympathy. Such 
narrative tactics that revolve around clear-cut 
contrasts allow Wajda to potently convey his 
national sentiments through negative visual 
representation of the czar’s troops, even if the 
victory in the film’s only battle with the Rus-
sians may strike the viewer as unrealistic be-
cause of its overtly chaotic character.
 As Cartmell and Hunter note, “commercially 
successful historical films tend to stick to a 
pattern clearly at odds with what academia 
knows as ‘history’”(5). In line with this general 
trend, which is widely accepted by his view-
ers, Wajda intentionally trades historical truth 
for his conservative patriotic vision. In more 
general terms, his strategy is also symptomatic 
of the modifications history undergoes when it 
is turned into fiction and then further adapted 
for the screen. According to Pierre Sorlin, “[t]
he contingent aspect of the historical tradition, 
with which historians are deeply concerned, is 
completely ignored by the producers of histori-
cal films. It must be said that this type of film is 
not a historical work: even if it appears to show 
the truth, it in no way claims to reproduce the 
past accurately” (37). Wajda’s 1999 heritage 
epic, albeit rather concerned with historical ac-
curacy when it comes to props and costumes, 
follows Mickiewicz’s fictional story to comment 
on the contemporary political and ideological 
moods in the country rather than to produce a 
truly historical account. The actual past events 
are often overshadowed by myths centered 
on individual protagonists. Yet even though 
modifications often exaggerate the glories 
of his nation, the director obeys his culture’s 
tradition. Pan Tadeusz never transgresses the 
dominant Polish conception of heroic national 
history, and thus Wajda’s perspective complies 
with the core mainstream Polish values.
 Even though they are at first sight quite tem-
peramental, the Polish-Lithuanian male charac-
ters in Pan Tadeusz are firm in their respect for 
the national tradition. On multiple occasions 
their behavior indicates that they observe their 
culture, with Catholicism as its integral part. 
Their faith clearly distinguishes them from the 
Russians. The local community in the story is 
often accompanied by priests and monks, who 
preach honor and respect. Thanks to their de-
votion and their charitable deeds, many charac-
ters are able to redeem their sins, as does Jacek 
Soplica, a murderer, who appears in the story 
and film dressed as a humble monk. In several 
scenes, religion offers strength and confidence 
to the Poles, who pray for love, courage, and 
national independence. All their prayers are 
answered toward the end of the film. The me-
chanical Russian soldiers are never portrayed 
engaging in any religious activity. Just as they 
have no faith, they also lack manners. In one of 
the pre-battle scenes, Major Plut is shown as 
obnoxious when he makes unwelcome sexual 
advances to Zosia and Telimena, who appear 
shocked, for noble Polish women are used to 
being treated with courtesy. Throughout the 
film, good manners in the presence of women 
clearly differentiate the modest and virtuous 
Poles from the Russians, who—as exemplified 
by Major Plut—are so weak that they cannot 
control their animal-like sexual desires.
 The moral and political weakness of the Rus-
sian crowd in the film is further confirmed in 
the conclusion to the story, when we learn that 
they fled in fear of the approaching Napoleonic 
army. The final engagement party crowns two 
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parallel stories, the romantic and the patriotic. 
When the previously exiled Polish soldiers 
come back home with the French as their al-
lies, they are clearly presented as victors. As 
the voice-over praises Polish achievements on 
the war front, the Russians virtually disappear 
from the story. To the viewer they are presented 
as so powerless that they are not even worth a 
mention. At the same time the engagement of 
young Tadeusz and virgin Zosia reunites the two 
conflicted families in a picturesque celebration. 
While watching the Polish-Lithuanian charac-
ters perform the last traditional dance in the 
film (the Polonez), the spectator remains fully 
convinced that they were correct in supporting 
the French in their struggle for independence. 
By means of implication, Wajda comforts his 
audience: Western Europe is the right political 
direction for their country.
 Corresponding to the needs of its audience, 
at the time of its release, Pan Tadeusz proved 
magnetic, as evidenced by its box office suc-
cess, but later Wajda did not avoid bitter words 
of criticism. While discussing heritage epics in 
the context of the national cinema, film journal-
ist Sebastian Jagielski writes in tones of disap-
proval, “Polish film industry reversed towards 
the past . . . [I]n peace and self-contentment 
our directors chewed up on the old works. . . . 
Polish cinema—always haunted by the past—
[is] flooded by the wave of costly adaptations 
of school readings” (55). Despite such critical 
voices, the Polish Film Institute (financed by 
the government), along with public television 
(Telewizja Polska) and some private investors, 
keeps injecting huge sums into monumental 
heritage/historical super-productions similar 
to Pan Tadeusz. In the eyes of some Polish 
film producers, such traditional, often binary 
affirmations of national identity still have the 
potential to appeal to the viewer—hence their 
efforts to maintain the life of film epics that 
have been quite popular in the country for the 
past forty years.
 As Iordanova notes, “East European cinemas 
were often involved in producing massive scale 
heritage epics usually chronicling episodes of 
the glorious past of the country and fulfilling 
the needs of romanticized representations of 
national history” (96). In the 1960s and 70s, 
with the use of the heritage/historical epic, the 
communist government in Poland promoted 
national pride and patriotism to accommodate 
the Polish people’s need for an exceptional 
and unique identity in the communist bloc. The 
epic operated as a tool in communist hands to 
convince Poles of good intentions of their ruling 
party. The fact that under communism Andrzej 
Wajda distanced himself from working within 
the constraints of the genre clearly speaks 
of his political opposition to the now-gone 
system. Paradoxically, when the old political 
stimuli for producing epics evaporated, Wajda 
turned to this very film template to promote his 
anticommunist convictions.
Katyn´: Polish Martyrs  
and the Murderous Soviet Machine
Whereas in Pan Tadeusz the eastern other was 
disguised as the nineteenth-century Russian 
czar’s soldier, in Katyn´ Wajda’s representations 
of eastern villains on the screen become much 
more literal in their red incarnations. Katyn´ 
clearly gravitates toward cinematic rediscovery 
of the atrocities and later misdeeds committed 
against the Polish by communist-minded Rus-
sians. Even though the film is often interpreted 
as one that “poses questions regarding [Polish] 
heroism and honor” (Sobolewski), the selec-
tion of events within the narrative is itself sug-
gestive of the director’s national sentiments. 
Katyn´’s cinematic journey to the times of World 
War II is on one hand reminiscent of previous 
works by Wajda such as Kanał and Ashes and 
Diamonds. Yet on the other, following historical 
suit, it shifts its focus on the enemy from the 
Germans to the Russians, who throughout the 
film materialize as overtly heartless Soviets, 
whereas the Germans brutalize the Poles only 
at the very beginning of the story.
 To emphasize the obscure nature of its sub-
ject matter, Katyn´ starts with tracking shots 
of bluish smoke and clouds over its credit 
sequence. However, from the next cut on, the 
story leaves the fogginess behind to move on to 
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a rather black and white portrayal of the massa-
cre and its circumstances (even though the film 
is in color), where moral judgments are easy 
to make. No doubt, the viewer is positioned 
to sympathize with the victims of the Soviet 
regime, and the negative portrayal of the com-
munists spirals upward as the film progresses. 
Played to evocative music, the culminating 
last sequence of the film gives a prolonged 
and repetitive account of the mechanical kill-
ings performed by the Soviets, who appear 
unscrupulous, bureaucratic, and inhumane. 
The metaphor of a murderous assembly-line 
structure populated with immoral and ethically 
numb Russians climaxes in the few final shots, 
when a bulldozer runs over the dead to cover 
up their mass grave. The brutally violent Soviet 
machinelike regime shows no respect for the 
human body, not to mention the soul.
 About one-third into the story, through visual 
and dialogic means, Wajda establishes a clear 
contrast between the Polish and the Soviets. 
Whereas the former come across as fully 
human, the latter are portrayed as parts in the 
perfunctory engine of totalitarian destruction. 
Except for one decent Russian character, Cap-
tain Popov, who saves Anna in the initial part 
of the film, the overall portrayal of the Soviets 
is overtly unfavorable and clearly in contrast to 
the qualities of Wajda’s own nation. Although 
the Polish characters often act overly dramatic, 
the Russians show no signs of emotion. The 
Polish pray; the Soviets kill. The Polish talk; 
the Soviets yell. The Polish think; the Soviets 
count. The Polish are nonconformists; the Rus-
sians comply with the Stalinist regime. Such 
binary oppositions detach the whole narrative 
from authenticity, and for the viewer even the 
documentary footage edited into the story 
fails to create a more realistic touch. This lack 
of verisimilitude paired with the frigid calm of 
the character buildup prompted criticism from 
international reviewers and brought restrictions 
to the popularity of the film outside its im-
mediate cultural context. Authors in Sight and 
Sound write that the film is “good rather than 
great” (Brooke and Kuc 34), and a Variety critic 
points that “[s]ome will admire the general 
absence of sentimentality, but for others, pic 
might seem too cold and lacking an emotional 
punch” (Felperin 26). Despite its Oscar nomina-
tion, the film did not succeed at the box office 
outside Poland. Too focused on the older gen-
eration’s Polish response to the event and po-
litically controversial, Katyn´ was shown on only 
two screens every weekend in the United States 
(“Box Office/Business for Katyn´”).
 Understandably, in Russia, where Wajda 
touched the chord of old national guilt, the 
reaction to the film was even more negative. In 
Russian media and politics, the responsibility 
for the Katyn´ Forest Massacre was still debated, 
and in 2007 the problem remained unresolved. 
The sensitive nature of the subject prevented 
the film from being shown in cinemas, and 
it took another three years for Katyn´ to be 
aired on Russian television. Under Putin the 
film’s one-dimensional portrayal of the Sovi-
ets sparked major controversies. Previously, 
the anti-Russian sentiments across Poland 
had been often discussed by politicians and 
nationwide Russian newspapers. Notably, in 
2005 an adviser to President Vladimir Putin, 
Gleb Pawlowski, said, “Poles talk about Rus-
sians the way anti-Semites talk about Jews” 
(Bernstein). However extreme, similar official 
statements indicated tensions in Polish-Rus-
sian relations. In this environment, the mas-
sacre presented on the screen as a mechanical 
act of murder proved to be too much for media 
gatekeepers in Russia.
 Yet for his own patriotic purposes, Wajda 
does not limit his portrayal of the totalitarian 
Soviet machine to the main act of distasteful 
violence, and he does not vilify communists in 
vain. All his contrast-based discursive strate-
gies serve to convey a message of admiration 
for his own nation’s moral strength, when 
confronted with victimization and relentless 
coercion by communist propagandists, who in 
an attempt to hide the truth about the massa-
cre abuse the Polish characters in the film. It is 
worth noting that any support for communism 
on behalf of Polish citizens is pushed to the 
margins of the story. Most of the main char-
acters withstand the Soviet rule after the war 
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with dauntless bravery, even if they are to pay 
the highest possible price of losing their life for 
their resistance. Jerzy, the only Polish character 
who overtly sways toward communism, quickly 
realizes his mistake and commits a spectacular 
suicide, caught on camera, to symbolically pun-
ish himself for his weakness.
 It does not take long for the viewer to realize 
that the individual stories centered on Anna, 
Róz˙a, and Agnieszka serve as pretexts to com-
ment on the collective. Fearless and morally su-
perior to their oppressors, all three main female 
characters resist postwar propaganda and man-
age to live by their prewar values. While being 
interviewed by communist police, Agnieszka, 
a former participant in the Warsaw Uprising, 
refuses to stay silent about Soviet involvement 
in Katyn´, even though such insubordination 
will get her arrested. One of the close-ups in 
the interview scene clearly reveals her pride, 
when she lifts her chin and her face radiates 
defiance. Similar resistance is characteristic of 
not only the youngest characters. When on the 
main city square Soviets screen a war chronicle 
about Katyn´ that blames Germans for the mas-
sacre, middle-aged Róz˙a, a widow whose officer 
husband was murdered in Katyn´, also publicly 
demonstrates her refusal to accept communist 
brainwashing. In the snow, surrounded by 
meaningful silence, Róz˙a appears in a middle 
shot yelling and banging on the window of the 
projectionist’s car. The energy of her anger 
clearly contrasts with the frozen emotions and 
ethics of those who screen the newsreels. The 
scene highlights her courage and solitude in 
her personal battle for honesty. Finally, Anna 
pursues the truth with no intention of giving 
up, until she comes across her husband’s Katyn´ 
diary, which only leads her to more suffering.
 In their own ways, the women in the story 
are as honorable as their men, who—loyal to 
the country—refuse to evade their tragic fate at 
the beginning of the film. The majority of Polish 
characters embody high moral values. Still, in 
their Catholic culture they are destined to suf-
fer in martyr-like fashion to defend their own 
beliefs and their loyalty to the country. Wajda’s 
recounting of the massacre and of the episodes 
surrounding it is infused with Catholic symbols 
of crosses, rosaries, churches, and words of 
prayers. The viewer observes the patriotic vic-
timized Poles, the martyrs of Soviet oppression.
 Just after its release in Poland in 2007, Katyn´ 
was heavily promoted by some critics. A writer 
for the popular Film magazine proclaimed, “You 
need to go and see Katyn´. The subject matter 
deserves it, Wajda deserves it, and, Poland 
deserves it . . . [y]ou should go, just like you 
should vote in elections, even if you do not like 
any of the political parties” (Rakowiecki 74). 
Despite such dramatic pleas for viewers’ sense 
of patriotism, at the domestic box office the 
film was still surpassed by Shrek the Third (“Pr-
zeboje kasowe 2007 w polskich kinach”). Be-
cause it came in second, on the outside it may 
still be regarded as quite a successful produc-
tion. However, those who appreciated it were 
the director’s fans, older-generation viewers, or 
conservative critics with patriotic inclinations.
 In 2007 Katyn´ failed to unite the nation 
and to bridge the generational gap among its 
domestic audience. To many younger viewers, 
the film functioned as just one more historical 
film. Despite Wajda’s cinematic efforts to bring 
national strengths into the spotlight, some de-
clared the production to be a disappointment. 
A review written by one of the readers of Film 
magazine articulated the convictions of Katyn´’s 
detractors: “The film came too late. Today, in 
the era of democracy and freedom of speech, 
one can scream about the difficult past of our 
nation, but it won’t be—as it used to be—an 
act of courage” (Putko 118). The author went on 
to say that the film featured highly stereotypi-
cal characters, its cinematography was rather 
mediocre, and it failed to be innovative or 
original. If nothing else, the words of the maga-
zine reader reflected the views of the younger 
audience, to whom the notions of Soviet guilt 
and national pride seemed worth only histori-
cal, not contemporary, debate. Representative 
of many younger voices, Jakub Boratyn´ski (born 
in 1971) of the Batory Foundation noticed that 
since Poland entered the European Union, 
anti-Russian sentiments had been on the de-
crease (Mite). Overall, to the audiences who 
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had had no direct involvement in the portrayed 
events, Katyn´ looked rather conservative and 
outmoded. Perhaps its overtly theatrical acting 
style coupled with the general pathos of the 
story added to its lack of appeal.
 However, in 2010 when Polish-Russian po-
litical tensions escalated, the film suddenly 
attracted new media attention. Strong anti-
Russian sentiments reemerged in Polish society 
following the plane crash in Smolen´sk. The ac-
cident on 2 April 2010 killed the country’s presi-
dent, Lech Kaczyn´ski (who had been a devoted 
propagator of Wajda’s film), and ninety-five 
others, including government and army of-
ficials. Ironically, all the passengers on board 
the crashed TU-154 had been on their way to 
commemorate the seventieth anniversary of 
the Katyn´ Forest Massacre. Conservative Polish 
media soon labeled the catastrophe as “the 
second Katyn´ massacre.” Widespread national 
mourning culminated in April and May events 
in Warsaw, where a colossal wooden cross was 
planted by scouts in front of the Presidential 
Palace. For several weeks, regardless of the 
weather, a significant number of people prayed 
in front of it for the victims of the catastrophe. 
The nation was symbolically traumatized, and 
such public lamentations gave an outlet for the 
despair of the hurt national spirit.
 Soon after the catastrophe, extreme 
right-wing media in the country, led by the 
ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja and 
television station TRWAM—both founded and 
managed by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, who was 
notorious for his chauvinist convictions—forged 
nationalistically driven campaigns to inves-
tigate the circumstances of the crash. Their 
numerous programs broadcast throughout 
2010 and 2011 clearly displayed anti-Russian 
sentiments, now visibly present in extremely 
conservative sections of Polish society. Similar 
views proliferated across right-wing press in 
the country, where theories of alleged Rus-
sian responsibility for the accident often sug-
gestively recalled the diplomatic role of the 
dead president Lech Kaczynski in the Georgian 
 conflict—whereby he had strongly opposed 
Putin’s government—as a potential reason for 
his death (Falkowski). The cult of the dead pres-
ident often relied on condemning the actions of 
the central liberal government. Radio Maryja’s 
Web site featured full versions of numerous 
press releases criticizing Polish prime minis-
ter Donald Tusk for his reconciliatory politics 
toward Russia. Accusing him of yielding to the 
superior Russian power in one of the interviews 
republished on the Web site, Ewa Thompson 
from Rice University nurtured anti-Russian 
sentiments: “If Poland becomes an economic 
and political vassal of Russia, cultural vassal-
age will follow . . . Now Poland (its government) 
has been pacified, just like during anti-Russian 
uprisings” (cited in Bober). Although Andrzej 
Wajda clearly distanced himself from such 
extreme nationalist voices, similar debates 
created bad press for his latest epic. Despite 
the fact that dissatisfied right-wing film critics 
heralded the film as “touching” yet one where 
“real [POW] heroes” were “overshadowed” 
(Rutkowska), now because of its subject mat-
ter Katyn´ seemed, to many younger viewers, to 
lean toward conservative political views.
 The endless prayers and media debates, 
along with the conspiracy theories, which 
blamed the Russians for the tragedy, brought 
back the old rivalry between the two nations, 
divided not only by their social and political 
ambitions but also by their religious beliefs. 
Just like the religious symbols in Wajda’s story 
of Katyn´, the giant crucifix spontaneously 
erected on the main street of the capital city 
stood for patriotism and superiority of the na-
tion, now again symbolically victimized. After 
a major national debate, which divided the 
Polish into supporters and opponents of the 
“Smolen´sk cross,” it was finally moved to one 
of the Warsaw churches in November 2010. The 
cross became a religious relic commemorating 
the national tragedy, and the cult of the dead 
president in the right-wing media evoked ad-
ditional parallels to national martyrology. As 
Wajda’s films establish, the symbolic definition 
of Polish national identity in the new Europe 
closely embraces Catholicism, which in turn 
distinguishes Poles from Orthodox or atheist 
Russians. With this in mind, the ostentatious 
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turn toward Catholic religion in the mourn-
ing country served as a symbolic gesture, an 
expression of national identity. According to 
Julian Borger and Helen Pidd reporting from 
Warsaw for the Guardian in the spring and 
summer of 2010, “the crash just opened a new 
wound on top of an old scar.”
 Under the pressure of the growing tension 
and in a gesture of reconciliation, Russian tele-
vision aired Wajda’s film for the second time. 
Following the broadcast, the press in Moscow 
appraised Katyn´’s portrayal of the 1940 massa-
cre. This time the film was acclaimed as a puri-
fying, almost cathartic picture. The turnaround 
in Russia was met with mixed reactions in 
Poland. Although some recognized the goodwill 
among their eastern neighbors, for others the 
development only bolstered convictions of the 
alleged Russian conspiracy. The latter opinions 
clearly sprang from anti-Russian sentiments, 
which persisted in Polish society regardless of 
any reconciliatory Russian gestures.
 Paradoxically, when Wajda’s film benefited 
from the political tension as it was used to 
reach out to the Russian viewer, in Poland the 
intensified right-wing voices conjured up ste-
reotypical binary differences between the two 
nations, which Wajda’s films seemed to have 
earlier propagated. Similarly constructed no-
tions of national identity—however separate 
from the right-wing chauvinism—soon also re-
surfaced in production plans for new film epics, 
again initiated by older-generation filmmakers. 
Given that Battle of Warsaw 1920, which tells 
the story of Polish victory over the Bolsheviks, 
was released in the fall of 2011, the historical 
anti-eastern revisionist sentiments injected into 
cinematic reproductions of the national past 
seem to be still in fashion.
Conclusion
When the grand national ideology was crippled 
after the systemic transformation, Wajda of-
fered a cinematic revival of the upright Polish, 
who might not have always been the winners, 
but whose spirits stayed undefeated. As far 
as their strong morality, his filmic Poles could 
win any contest. In a nostalgic fashion, the 
director’s epics cinematically reaffirmed this 
particular aspect of Polish national identity. At 
the same time, Pan Tadeusz met the need for a 
confirmation of the national ability to overcome 
the post-transformation hurdles. As the Polish 
first adopted capitalist and democratic values 
in the 1990s, Wajda’s pejorative portrayal of 
the Russians helped advocate his pro-Western 
convictions. His Russian troops appeared 
spineless and thus inferior to Poles, to the sat-
isfaction of the pro-European mentality of the 
director’s audience. With its victorious alliance 
of the Polish and the French, Wajda’s first-ever 
heritage epic fulfilled viewers’ expectations 
and certainly assisted its audience in their 
political choices. By bringing to the screen the 
mechanical Soviet murderers, eight years later 
Katyn´ again vilified the Russians. This time they 
allegorically emerged as responsible for the 
hardships of the nation, which had to struggle 
against the ghosts of its communist past. Not 
only were the Russian villains in both Wajda’s 
epics justified by events in the narratives, but 
they also served as a foundation on which the 
director constructed the identity of his Polish 
characters. Shortly after both films were re-
leased, Wajda’s rendition of national conflicts 
with the eastern neighbor automatically trans-
lated into the immediate political and social 
circumstances of his Polish viewers.
 However, as times have changed, Wajda’s 
selective nostalgic view of the national past 
has faced increasing criticism. Across differ-
ent generations and in the context of recent 
Polish-Russian tensions, opinions regarding his 
film epics are ever more divided. Commenting 
on the contemporary Eastern European film 
epic, Roumania Deltcheva argues, “In the new 
conditions, the introspection into the . . . past 
transcends the expected function of going back 
to common traditional foundations to reaffirm 
permanence and interconnectedness. More 
importantly, delving into the past engages col-
lective identities and individual psychologies in 
a complex interplay” (207). Now with their dif-
fering national preconceptions as well as their 
diverging approaches to the communist expe-
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rience, the Polish, whose collective national 
identity is much more stable, are far from being 
unified in their response to Wajda’s epic works. 
The processes related to globalization obvi-
ously have an additional impact on the national 
feelings, as they prompt many Poles to depart 
from simplistic notions of their own national 
identity. Even though the political right wing, 
often closely related to the Catholic Church in 
the country, still nurtures traditional prejudice 
against supposed Russian enemies, best ex-
emplified by the conspiracy theories following 
the crash in Smolen´sk, elsewhere in the media 
anti-Russian sentiments tend to be labeled as 
conservative. To the majority of young Poles, 
Wajda’s onscreen stereotyped Russian seems 
less and less appealing. From their perspective 
his contemporary epic is often seen as already 
dated, even if “Wajda regards the film as a sym-
bolic burial of the [Katyn´] victims” (Sobolewski).
 Bitter criticism articulated by many journal-
ists and viewers and the younger generation’s 
lack of interest in Wajda’s second epic are 
quite symptomatic of the changing times. The 
domestic critical reception of Katyn´, when 
compared to that of Pan Tadeusz, clearly dis-
closes that the historic national themes, even 
if dealing with fairly recent events, do not find 
the same acclaim as they used to. Although 
nostalgic views of national heroism set against 
the Russians (e.g., Battle of Warsaw 1920) per-
sist among the older generation of Polish film-
makers, none of the younger directors choose 
similar themes. The epic has lost its soothing 
value for the young in the nation. To many, 
Wajda’s positive image of the strong Pole in 
Pan Tadeusz and Katyn´ is overshadowed by the 
epics’ now high-risk anti-Russian sentiments, 
which when removed from their filmic contexts 
may have the power to ignite conflicts with the 
eastern neighbor of the country. Because Poles 
are now firmly established in their alliance with 
Europe, there seems to be only limited cultural 
space for onscreen vilification of Russians, 
however revisionist. The changes on the politi-
cal scene call for the Polish film epic to depart 
from national sentiments and revisit its take on 
cinematic nostalgia for the past.
 Nostalgia film first came under critical 
scrutiny in 1991 thanks to Fredric Jameson’s 
seminal article on the subject. In Jameson’s 
view, historical references to the past in film 
form an uncreative practice and are somehow 
unproductive when it comes to understand-
ing both the history and the future. However, 
he restricted his definition of nostalgia film 
to generic and intertextual references within 
the postmodern American cinema. Far from 
any postmodern ambitions, Wajda’s nostalgia 
clearly differs from the Jamesonian notion. 
At first, the use of the national past in Pan 
Tadeusz appeared ideologically beneficial 
for his audience, who almost immediately 
engaged in contextual/allegorical readings. 
The director steered clear of pure commodi-
fication of the past and entered the realm of 
national identity. His first epic production 
linked the national tradition of film epic to the 
new symptoms of cultural trauma in a society 
that was undergoing serious political and 
social changes in the 1990s. Wajda’s creative 
practice of revitalizing the national identity 
did not only reach back to the history as such, 
but selectively modified it to convey the then 
socially valid contemporary messages.
 Either praising the glories of his ancient an-
cestors or showing them caught up as victims 
in history, in a quintessentially modernist man-
ner, Wajda continues the long Polish tradition 
of accommodating romanticized visions of the 
national past for the needs of his contempo-
raries. In both Pan Tadeusz and Katyn´ the his-
tory on the screen is marked by heroism (either 
literal or defined in moral terms) that has been 
planted in Polish public imagery since the nine-
teenth century. However, with his tenacious use 
of national identity set against the Soviet World 
War II enemy in the 2007 film, Wajda is now 
seen to have failed to adapt to the changing 
times, and this is why his nostalgic camera is 
criticized regardless of his patriotism. Paradoxi-
cally, the director who objects to false visions 
of history falls into the trap of unintentionally 
advocating black and white national stereo-
types among his viewers, which for them falsify 
the present. Cartmell and Hunter comment on 
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the power that filmic modifications of history 
may have over viewers: “[T]he understanding of 
the past by non-historians—‘ordinary people’ 
if you like—is by its representation in film and 
fiction. . . . Oscar Wilde remarked that there 
was no fog in London till the Impressionists 
painted it. In the same spirit we might say that 
history is the invention of creative artists as 
much as an objective record of true events” 
(1). Wajda creatively reproduces history from 
his own subjective perspective. His epics tell 
stories that, in the new context of the second 
decade of the new millennium, revive animosi-
ties between the Polish and the Russians rather 
than heal the shaken national spirit, as they 
initially might have done. With his arbitrary 
conservative recounting of historical facts, just 
like Oscar Wilde’s impressionists, Wajda adds 
fog to the already obscured situation on the 
Polish-Russian political scene. Symbolically, 
the mist from the opening shots of Katyn´ does 
not rise as a falsification of history that needs 
to be cleared by the film, but rather it floats as 
a haze over presently delicate Polish-Russian 
relations. The conservative patriotic sentiments 
shining through Katyn´ may have an obfuscating 
effect on the film’s audience, which certainly 
weakens the pioneering historically revisionist 
stance of the production.
 The conservative character of Wajda’s film 
epics does not conclude with his national 
sentiments. He also limits the representation 
of his own people to either the gentry, whose 
idyllic life is being recreated on the screen, 
or alternatively to the twentieth-century intel-
ligentsia fighting against the Soviet oppression. 
By restricting the nation to just two historically 
very small classes, his epics follow the domi-
nant Polish vision of the national history. In 
addition, his recycled themes from Polish wars 
(no matter if they are ancient or based in the 
twentieth century) fall hand in hand with the 
current school teaching curriculum, which is 
not contested on cinematic grounds. With no 
intention to transgress the tradition, Wajda’s 
modernist adherence to the Polish hegemonic 
view of history, with its integral national senti-
ments, makes his films somehow redundant to 
the new, even domestic audience, who grew up 
in a different cultural environment from the one 
of the director’s generation.
note
 1. All quotes from Polish sources are translated by 
the author of this article.
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